Based on the language concerning road improvements, I suspect they intend for full scale mining/floatation plant operations to commence after July 31st.
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This update is late, but somehow it’s still perfect timing to quell the wringing circling the drain. 
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Hey baldy, thank you for trying to guide me with these bullet points, even though they’re mostly inaccurate or irrelevant now. I’m briefly addressing these points in reverse order …
5. I have Brittish friends & family in Australia, so I’ve known about the differences btw football & soccer.
4. If you understood my question to MG, you would know that it was about a previous statement he made some weeks ago. I read MG’s posts and all the data available, and I concluded that the mining operations were still active. I wanted validation, considering recent posts claiming all activities were shut down.
3. Whether it be hindsight or good reasoning based on available info, I knew that just wasn’t accurate.
2 & 1. And? Please clarify, if you think it’s worth the effort. 
Perfect timing and this investment don’t belong in the same universe, let alone the same thought.
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Perfect timing absolutely described the point I was making in that post. Sorry you missed it, Jimmy. 
No actually you missed it completely. Proper timing for an update was missed months ago. There wouldn’t be pissing and moaning if they acted professionally.
There will be plenty of time to give these guys credit when they actually produce an ROI for investors. In the meantime, dont feel the need to applaud the inexcusable.
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lol! I wasn’t applausing anybody! Your interpretation kept making me laugh, and you wouldn’t let it go. how funny that’s how you interpretted it. 
NOTE: I posted that it was perfect timing in the same sentence I said the update was late. That was the first clue. The update was right on time after a few inaccurate posts were made & share price was diving. I added that the update will quell the wringing of hands & circling the drain. (In other words, it should stop the negative & inaccurate posts claiming AUMC was shut down.) Does that help you understand now? Sheesh! 
I often struggle to understand if you read anything beyond this message board to inform your posts. AUMC does not issue an overwhelming quantum of information via Twitter or PRs yet some pretty basic info/concepts seem to circumvent you sponge of AUMC retention. The receipt of permits, a carbon footprint (??), perfect timing for an update that is months beyond the regular quarterly update, over a month beyond a VERY material event AND, AND, clearly evades what we all know to be public knowledge.
They may indeed be making progress with the local community and addressing any perceived gaps in permitting. Maybe its all blue skies from here. However, to dismiss the mayor shutting down whatever portion of the operations for however long as “receiving an inquiry and complaint regarding certain project activities such as the camp, tailing facility and land use” should actually create more concerns vs. alleviating them.
Even if they completely resolved these issues they should at least dislcose what actually happened with a certain level of accuracy and details. I mean…there’s a fricking video on Twitter with ACDC theme music.
As much as MC would like to control the narrative, Theminingplay doesn’t miss much. You, on the other hand, are a rare bird…
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BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD FOR MY PROJECTIONS
Management originally told us that the “nominal throughput rate” for the froth flotation plant was 100 Tonnes per day which equates to 3,000 Tonnes per month. Then they put out a vague blurb saying that they increased the size of the order they originally placed with the manufacturer of the “FF” plant, BUT THEY DIDN’T GIVE US THE NEW PROJECTED “NOMINAL THROUGHPUT RATE”. In yesterday’s update we now learn that the updated “nominal throughput rate” is 4,950 Tonnes per month instead of 3,000 TPM. This is a 65% increase from 100 TPD to 165 TPD. For me, the question arises as to what management (or the financiers) learned in between placing the first order and the subsequent addendum to the order. It appears to me that the overall RISK must have come down a notch.
These “nominal throughput rates” have to do with “production rates”. They represent the weight of the crushed and ground ore sent from the ball mill to the FF plant. The real question for those of us that have been (admittedly roughly) estimating Auryn’s future profitability based upon the data available, has to do with what likely effect on PROFITS will a 65% increase in PRODUCTION RATE result in. The answer to that has to do with Auryn’s ALL IN SUSTAINING COST (AISC) structure and the breakdown between FIXED COSTS and VARIABLE COSTS. Why is this?
The formula for profits involves the price Auryn will be paid to generate an ounce of gold equivalent (in “concentrate” form) and this figure parallels the “spot” price of gold. From that price of gold figure we need to subtract the ALL IN SUSTAINING COST (AISC) to produce each one of those ounces of gold equivalent. The result is the “MARGINAL PROFIT PER OUNCE PRODUCED”. When the production rate goes up 65%, THE NUMBER OF OUNCES OF GOLD EQUIVALENT PRODUCED WILL GO UP 65%. BUT THAT’S ONLY HALF OF THE STORY because a lot of those “extra” ounces didn’t cost anything at all to produce because many of the “COSTS” are “FIXED COSTS” and do NOT parallel the production rate. Other COSTS are called “VARIABLE COSTS” and these costs do roughly parallel the production rate BUT OFTEN NOT ON A 1-for-1 BASIS.
In “UNDERGROUND MINING”, SRK Consulting, Inc. tells us that about 70% of the costs are “FIXED COSTS” that do not go up when the production rate goes up. About 30% of the costs, on the other hand, are “VARIABLE COSTS” which do go up, to some extent, with an increasing production rate. The “FIXED COSTS” might include things like road maintenance, cost of capital, mining concession taxes, camp operations, equipment leases, executive salaries, environmental monitoring, etc. The “VARIABLE COSTS” might include fuel, processing reagents, crushing costs, wear parts, hourly mining wages after the stockpiled ore is exhausted, etc.
When you do the math, a 65% increase in the production rate at the typical underground mining operation with 70% of the costs being “FIXED COSTS”, the “MARGINAL PROFIT PER OUNCE PRODUCED” should go up approximately 100% and not 65%. This is a very powerful phenomenon, and you can see how motivated Auryn is going to be to rapidly ramp up “PRODUCTION RATES”. What does this mean as far as the ALL IN SUSTAINING COST PER OUNCE PRODUCED or “AISC”?
In underground mining operations with 70% of the costs being “FIXED”, when the production rate goes up 65%, the AISC (per ounce produced) goes down QUITE A BIT. This translates into the “MARGINAL PROFIT PER OUNCE PRODUCED” going up quite a bit. Two things are going on simultaneously. While the number of ounces is going up 65%, the MARGINAL PROFIT PER OUNCE PRODUCED is ALSO going up right alongside it. Since you need to MULTIPLY the number of ounces being produced by the MARGINAL PROFIT PER OUNCE PRODUCED in order to calculate TOTAL PROFITS, when BOTH of these factors are increasing in a side-by-side fashion SIMULTANEOUSLY, the TOTAL PROFITS go up a SIGNIFICANT amount. The fact that the production rate is going up 65% is a lot better news than you might have thought since this is an underground mining operation with significant “FIXED COSTS”.
OK, IF THIS IS TRUE, THEN WHY DIDN’T AURYN JUST PUT IN A 500 OR 1,000 TONNES PER DAY FF PLANT IN THE FIRST PLACE?
This has to do with RISK/REWARD analyses. There is a concept in mineral economics that has to do with the use of “PILOT PLANTS”. In order to keep CAPEX costs and risk levels manageable, a lot of miners fortunate enough to be going into production start out with ULTRA-CONSERVATIVE “pilot plants” until the “proof of concept” is established. A 165 Tonne per day froth flotation plant is miniscule by any standards, so don’t expect the throughput to remain at those levels for very long. Keep in mind that Auryn didn’t do a lot of drilling prior to making a “positive production decision”. Auryn’s financiers, “SISAC” and Maurizio, willfully chose to shoulder that extra risk burden. So, I can appreciate the “pilot plant” approach for now because it limits potential losses for them. The flip side of that is that Auryn made it into production with only 70 million shares outstanding and therefore their potential “EARNINGS PER SHARE” could be off the charts. BECAUSE OF THE APPROACH TAKEN, THERE IS A LOT RIDING ON HOW AURYN PROGRESSES FROM THIS POINT ONWARDS BECAUSE THE POTENTIAL UPSIDE IS ENORMOUS.
Financiers like “SISAC” that gave Auryn $4 million to buy their FF plant, could have written a check for $20 million, but they need protection from things like the price of gold falling out of bed or SERNAGEOMIN not signing off on the FF plant or the tailings storage facility. Bad things that might happen to a mining project tend to happen early on. If SISAC was willing to cut a $4 million check early on when the RISKS were prominent, how much larger of a check might they be willing to write after SERNAGEOMIN signed off on all of those permits and the “proof of concept” was established? There are 7 Main Veins in play at the ADL Mining District, what’s the hurry?
BECAUSE AURYN ALREADY HAS A MINIMUM OF ABOUT 68 THOUSAND TONNES OF HIGH-GRADE ORE ALREADY STOCKPILED, THE ESTIMATIONS FOR THE PROFITS IN YEAR 1 ARE A BIT TRICKY
Nine months ago Auryn stated that they had already stockpiled “over 60,000 Tonnes” of high-grade ore. They have been mining at a rate of 1,000 Tonnes per month (TPM) in the interim. Those mining expenses related to the stockpiled ore have already been paid a long time ago. They are part of the amount currently owed to Maurizio. You can do the “accounting” for this situation any way you choose. If you concentrate on the current amount owed to Maurizio as being “X”, then the AISC for the first year or two of operations is going to be super low because the on-site mining costs (sometimes called C-1 CASH COSTS) are going to be de minimis.
After a couple of years and the previously stockpiled ore is exhausted, the CASH COSTS are going to go back up relative to where they were in Year 1 or Year 2. But by then there will be a brand new stockpile of ore resulting from the mining recently completed, the mining being done today, and the mining being done between now and when the earlier stockpiles are exhausted. Auryn is going to be in the enviable position to choose the highest grade ore from all of these sources. This will constantly put upward pressure on the “AVERAGE GRADE” being mined and processed.
Because of the increase in PRODUCTION RATE going up 65% and the fact that Auryn has already paid for and stockpiled about 68,000 Tonnes of ore, the AISC for the first couple of years is going to super low, and the MARGINAL PROFITS are going to be, in a relative sense, super high. But this is only for the short term so don’t get too used to it. It will take about 14 months to process 68,000 Tonnes of stockpiled ore but during that 14 months a new stockpile of ore is being formed. During this current quarter, Auryn expects to get the green light to mine at a rate of 3,000 Tonnes per month at the Northeast Drift off of the Antonino Adit at Level 3.
LET’S RUN SOME NUMBERS
Due to the war in Iran and the partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the spot price of gold has currently dropped from $5,600 per ounce to about $4,100 per ounce. With an AISC of, let’s say, $1,100 per ounce produced, Auryn should be able to generate profits of about $3,000 per ounce even at this relatively low price of gold. Let’s say that the average grade mined is 15.5 grams per Tonne, which is 0.5 ounces per Tonne. With an initial nominal throughput rate of 4,950 Tonnes per month (165 Tonnes per day), Auryn should produce about 59,400 Tonnes of ore per annum once the froth flotation plant is all “dialed in”. Let’s round that 59,400 Tonnes figure to 60,000 Tonnes for now and adjust it back later on.
If you produce 60,000 Tonnes annually with an average grade of 0.5 ounces per Tonne, you are averaging 30,000 “gold equivalent” ounces per year, again once everything is all “dialed in”. These are referred to as “contained ounces”. If your FF plant “recovery rate” averages 80% (the norm is from 70% to 90%), then your “recoverable ounces” figure becomes 24,000 ounces per annum (30,000 times 0.8). If your profit margin is $3,000 per ounce then the pre-tax GROSS PROFITS should be about $72 million per annum or a little bit over $1 per share. Keep in mind that there are only 70 million shares issued and outstanding fully diluted. Feel free to insert any numbers you feel to be accurate. Am I predicting that Auryn will clear $72 million pre-tax in year 1? Absolutely not.
If the situation at the Straight of Hormuz gets remedied and the oil starts flowing again at the pre-war rates, and if the price of gold goes to, let’s say, $5,100, then the marginal profit per ounce produced goes from $3,000 to $4,000 per ounce. You can do the math when you’re dealing with 24,000 “recoverable ounces”. The point here is not to make specific prognostications about future earnings but to point out that these are some pretty serious numbers we’re talking about. The concepts involving the production rate going up 65% and the AISC being driven down SIMULTANEOUSLY due to the preponderance of the AISC costs being of a “FIXED” nature, are very serious concepts, although perhaps a bit confusing at first.
It’s interesting how everybody in this sector is all bummed out that the price of gold recently dropped by about $1,500 per ounce. Yet many of the Wall Street mega-banks are expecting the price of gold to go to $5,500 to $6,000 per ounce in the not too distant future. What people don’t realize is that historically, in this sector, clearing $3,000 per ounce is almost unheard of. The “producers” are basically printing money right now. This is a very fortuitous time to become a high-grade gold producer.
Keep in mind that Auryn feels that they could be permitted to produce 3,000 TPM at the Northeast Drift and another 2,000 TPM at the Caren Mine/Merlin 1 Vein during this current quarter Q-4, 2026.
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Just this week, the largest Wall Street “mega-bank”, JP Morgan Chase, slashed their 2026 gold prediction by 25%, radically undercutting their earlier $6,000 call. They predict sideways movement for the foreseeable future, with a possible Q4 bump to $4,500. Goldman Sacks recently downgraded gold by 20% and 4 days ago US Bank dropped their forecast 14% to under $4,400. Uncertainty and the continued disconnect between gold and traditional geopolitcal/economic factors render 2027 predictions tantamount to worthless.
Gold is behaving like a risk asset not as a inflation hedge. And none of this is what continually ails this “investment”. Yet some things never change.
You are being overly generous if that is the only edit/correction/fact check you want to highlight in this latest “sci-fi thriller” post. The silence was brief but appreciated. All it took was a belated update that (should have) created more questions than answers but, if there is even a crumb of possible positivity you can rest assured that the spin will devour, inflate and speculate until the crumb morphs into a massive loaf of bread.
One could and should have a number of questions as to how a plant permitted and designed at 100tpd could magically scale to 165tpd before it was even commissioned. Any credible engineer and/or plant manager who understands the complexities and timelines for increasing capacity at this stage would be chuckling in their beer but, in the their absence you can expect the dough to rise to the sky.
Could AUMC have increased the scale of the plant right before commissioning? No mention of this in Jan update? Maybe waiting for the subsequent receipt of related permits? Technically it’s possible via adding floatation capacity, increasing thickeners, upgrading pumps, changing piping, etc but it feels a bit “off” given how close they were to supposedly processing ore 7 months ago, already being very delayed and the more recent environmental/community issues that MGold (not the company) uncovered.
A few additional clarifications that might be worth highlighting:
Processing stockpiles does not eliminate AISC. Processing stockpiles may reduce current mining cash expenditures, but companies still incur:
- sustaining capital
- administration
- maintenance
- permitting
- environmental
- development
- processing costs
Mining the stockpile still incurred:
- mining costs
- labor
- equipment
- development
Those costs are generally capitalized into inventory.
Processing stockpiled ore reduces future mining cash outflows, but it does not make those ounces free.
AISC is not simply:
fixed costs + variable costs.
AISC includes items such as:
- sustaining capital
- rehabilitation
- corporate overhead
- sustaining development
- exploration (sometimes)
- ongoing mine development
While the vocal minority sharpens their calculators with a fresh set of exponential earnings forecasts, most are just looking for some sort of clear confirmation on the status of actual mining (vs admittedly important infrastructure improvements) and if/when the community/permitting issues will be resolved.
Can you imagine if BB’s analysis of AISCs was accurate? If simply increasing scale/volume had that sort of inverse relationship to AISCs the Barricks and Newmonts of the world would average AISC’s of $50oz (vs $1400oz) and, using the same logic, micro miners like PPX and AUMC would have AISCs of well over $10koz. Lucky for AUMC, TMP “analysts” start with a base case of $1200oz (my best bet, it’s closer to $2000oz) so their “perceived” jump in throughout drops their costs to industry record lows.
The fixed-cost assumption is unsupported
“70% of underground mining costs are fixed.”
In reality:
- underground mining cost structures vary enormously
- many underground mines have much larger variable cost components
- labor
- explosives
- ground support
- haulage
- ventilation
- consumables
- maintenance
all scale with production.
Confusing? That’s the point… and now… back to your regularly scheduled programming.
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Let’s dig into the ridiculousness of this claim (68k tonnes) of high grade stockpiled material. We can set aside the glaring fact that there is no visual evidence of a stockpile anywhere near this quantum. Layer on the additional assumption that AUMC is mining 1000 tonnes a month to add to to the stockpile. This is assuming that all of the mining involves extracting valuable ore. Consider the following statement from January’s update:
Despite encountering localized structural complexity, including faulting and vein variability, the primary Fortuna vein has been successfully reached and is now available for exploitation. Mine development has continued with the preparation of accumulation chambers and advancement of bypass development, positioning the operation to support sustained ore production.
Since the October update its pretty clear that they have been mining to reach the Fortuna vein and as of January it was “now availalbe for exploitation.” This clearly implies that there was three months of mining barren rock to reach the ore. Even if they were mining at 1kt per month (which is actually the maximum rate) those three months/3kt may have been stockpiled but they most likely ain’t worth anything.
Auryn proceeds to confirm the above in the following sentence:
On January 2, 2026, mine development on the 1847 level reached the vein. On January 8, 2026, the first official blast was completed in the Northwest drift, marking the transition into ore production. To date, approximately 150 tonnes of ore have been stockpiled on surface, with mining activities continuing to expand the mineralized block.
We aren’t talking about thousands of tonnes but rather 150 over several months of mining.
In October’s update AUMC made the following statement:
During the quarter, our contractor continued upgrades to the Antonino Tunnel and advanced mining work to connect it with the upper-level Fortuna access known as “Fortuna 1913.” This integration – authorized under an exploration project approved by Chile’s mining authority (SERNAGEOMIN) – is expected to enhance safety, ventilation, and overall mining efficiency while reducing dilution.
Does this sound like AUMC was stockpiling 3k tonnes of high grade ore over the third quarter or what they describe as “upgrades in ventilation”, etc. I don’t feel its neccessary to provide an explanation b/w mining a vein and connecting access points (barren rock).
Now apply these most recent examples to the last decade(s) of mining with all of the starts and stops, care and maintenace, lack of financing, pivots, etc, etc. While its true that AUMC came across additioanal mineralization/veins in the long quest to identify their target, the vast majority of mining was clearling barren rock to reach the DL. Where would 60k tonnes of high grade stockpile ore come from? Artinsenal mining?? Maybe JJ and Les had a top secret mining operation that they hid from investors over the past 30 years?? Did they hide this massive mountain of rocks under a pile of leaves?
Even AUMC admits that, as of today, only a fraction of the stockpiled ore has been sorted for proecssing.
Stockpile evaluation and sampling activities have continued. Approximately 13,000 tonnes of ore are prepared and currently being transported to the plant’s ore stockpile area for use during initial start-up. Total on-site stockpiles are estimated to exceed 60,000 tonnes, providing operational flexibility during ramp-up.
Does anyone find it odd that AUMC never spent the time nor money to sample ANY of these high grade tonnes? Stockpiled ore is some of the easiest to assay, even as a representative sample. Maybe they have and the super secret results are too proprietary for the lowly shareholders? A “normal” company and/or a public company that wanted to improve visibility for its shareholders might consider engaging a third party to generate even a high level report on the actual:
- measured stockpile tonnage,
- average grade,
- contained ounces, or
- expected recoverable metal.
They are cleary spending money. Why wouldn’t MC decide to take this invaluable step both for investors and, more importantly for the company to esstablish some visibility of future production/economics? Wouldn’t this information be critical in determining the mine plan as this materiial would/should be blended with newly mined ore. Yet another KEY unknown variable that should have been disclosed and/or determined YEARS ago. Every loaf starts with a crumb with big dreams.
About a year ago, I put together a rudimentary model using company updates, specifically related to mining operations, over the past several years in an attempt to explain a 20k tonne stockpile. The math didn’t add up and nobody on this board could offer an explanation. Today, the magical hill of beans has tripled, and morphed into 60k tonnes of HIGH GRADE material.
AUMC describes the stockpile as the following:
Stockpiles
Geology and metallurgy teams continued evaluating and segregating stockpiled material at Fortuna by grade.
- Prepared for processing: ~28,000 tons ready for the plant at start-up.
- Total on site (estimated): >60,000 tons available to supplement plant feed over time.
- Commissioning strategy: During the plant’s 30-to-45-day commissioning period, we plan to run lower-grade material to fine-tune recovery and operating parameters before processing higher-grade ore.
I’d start by highlighting that AUMC points out that some portion of this stock pile is “lower grade material”. Its also worth noting that the 28k tons ready for the plant start up has been reduced to 13k tones in the latest update. I’d have to defer to BB on how/why/or what planet, this pile of dirt is now being described as 60k tons of:
high grade material
as neither company updates nor basic common sense have confirmed the same.
Is this factor paramount to the AUMC investment thesis? Absolutely not. However flippant analysis using the quantum and grade of this “hidden” pile of gold is 1) indicative of a larger, pervasively flawed, analysis and 2) ultimately clouding the merits and potential of a decently attractive small scale operation that has missed a long series of deadlines BUT is nearing the starting line.
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My last post of the weekend
THE BELOW IS FROM AN AI PROMPT ASKING TO COMPARE MC’S GUIDANCE VS. DELIVERY
This is a decent summary of the past several years, both the good and bad but doesn’t include the recent community issues as those have not been made public (by AUMC).
Overall Pattern
Over the past several years, AUMC has consistently announced aggressive timelines for plant construction, permitting, and production. While many physical and regulatory milestones have eventually been achieved, they have generally occurred well after the original guidance. The largest gap remains the transition from construction to sustained commercial operations.
Plant Construction
Guidance
- Flotation plant announced in late 2023.
- Financing secured in 2024.
- Originally guided to be operational by May 2025 , later revised to Q3 2025 .
Actual Outcome
- Construction progressed much slower than anticipated.
- Plant was not substantially complete until March 2026 .
- Commissioning was still ongoing as of July 2026 .
Result: Approximately 6–10 months behind guidance .
Permitting
Delivered
- Plant operating permit obtained (February 2026).
- Tailings permit obtained (January 2026).
- Revised 1,000 t/month Fortuna mining permit approved (April 2026).
Still Outstanding
- 3,000 t/month Fortuna permit repeatedly delayed and still pending as of July 2026.
- Caren permit disappeared from near-term guidance after repeated delays.
Result: Major permits were eventually obtained, but later than originally projected.
Mining Operations
Guidance
- Regular mining and stockpiling throughout 2023.
- Initial production targeted for Q3 2025.
- Regular 1,000 tonnes/month expected by Q4 2025.
Actual Outcome
- Mining was paused during 2024.
- First production blast did not occur until January 2026.
- No evidence of sustained monthly production has been reported.
Result: Development progressed, but commercial-scale mining has not yet been demonstrated.
Plant Throughput
Management consistently described the flotation plant as a 100 tpd facility throughout 2024 and 2025.
In July 2026, however, the company suddenly described the approved plant as capable of processing 4,950 tonnes per month (roughly 165 tpd ) without clearly explaining:
- when the capacity increased,
- whether the plant was redesigned,
- whether larger equipment was ordered,
- or whether the permitting process was amended to reflect the larger plant.
While the final permit may authorize the larger capacity, the change was never clearly disclosed as it occurred.
Missing Operational Metrics
Despite years of updates, the company has still not reported many of the metrics investors typically expect once a plant is commissioned, including:
- Monthly tonnes processed
- Gold recovery
- Concentrate grades
- Concentrate shipments
- Revenue
- Operating costs
- Cash flow
- Commercial production declaration
Instead, updates continue to focus primarily on construction progress, permitting, commissioning, and future expectations.
Overall Assessment
AUMC deserves credit for eventually delivering a permitted flotation plant, tailings facility, and underground mine development.
However, management’s timeline guidance has repeatedly proven overly optimistic. Nearly every major operational milestone has been delayed, and investors are still waiting for the most important deliverable:
Evidence that the mine and flotation plant can operate continuously and profitably at commercial scale.
The investment question has shifted from “Can they build it?” to “Can they successfully operate it?” As of July 2026, that question remains unanswered based on the company’s public disclosures.
I SUBMITTED ANOTHER AI PROMPT IN REGARDS TO ANY UPDATES ON THE COMMUNITY ISSUES.
What I found
The shutdown appears genuine and more serious than a routine community complaint. On or around June 6–8, 2026, Curacaví municipal officials physically visited AUMC’s Cerro Carén site, placed closure seals on the facilities, and ordered the immediate and complete suspension of plant operations.
The municipality identifies the operator as Minera La Fortuna Lampa, the Chilean entity associated with Auryn Mining/AUMC’s Altos de Lipangue project. The central municipal finding was that the mine and processing facilities were actually located within Curacaví’s jurisdiction—not Lampa—and had no corresponding Curacaví municipal permits or business license.
As of July 12, 2026, I found no public confirmation that the closure has been lifted, no announcement that Curacaví permits have been issued, and no detailed public response from AUMC explaining its position.
Translation of the mayor’s video
The clearest available portion of Mayor Christian Hernández’s statement translates approximately as follows:
“We are at the top of Cerro Carén, at the facilities of Minera La Fortuna Lampa—which, ultimately, is not in Lampa. We have been able to establish, thanks to the work of the environmental department and the municipal works department, that it is located in the territory of Curacaví.”
He then says, in substance:
“We have proceeded to close the facilities pursuant to the authority established in the General Law of Urbanism and Construction.”
The municipality’s accompanying message stated:
“The voice of the residents was heard. Today we closed a mining operation that did not have municipal permits and that was affecting our territory.”
The last statement is political advocacy rather than a formal technical conclusion. It is important to distinguish the mayor’s assertion that the mine was “affecting” the territory from documented proof that contamination or environmental damage had already occurred.
What the municipal inspection reportedly concluded
I was not able to locate the underlying signed inspection report or closure decree in a publicly indexed municipal database. However, several local reports reproduce what appear to be the municipality’s official findings.
1. The facilities are inside Curacaví
The Municipal Works Directorate reportedly conducted technical measurements and concluded that the plant buildings and associated infrastructure were within the Curacaví boundary.
This seems to have been a threshold issue. The company’s Chilean subsidiary is called Minera La Fortuna Lampa, and the municipality emphasized that despite the name—and possibly previous assumptions about jurisdiction—the site was not actually in Lampa.
2. No Curacaví municipal authorizations were on file
Municipal officials reportedly searched their records and found no:
- municipal business license or patente municipal;
- building or construction authorizations;
- local operating authorization;
- other municipal permissions required for the facilities.
The municipal account therefore does not merely say that one permit was incomplete. It says the operation lacked the required local authorization framework altogether.
3. Environmental and archaeological risks were identified
The Curacaví environmental department reportedly gathered information identifying risks involving:
- possible contamination of runoff reaching Estero Puangue;
- intervention or disturbance of native forest;
- potential effects on archaeological heritage;
- impacts on local flora and fauna.
The wording is significant. The local report generally refers to “risks,” “alerts,” or “possible contamination,” not confirmed sampling results demonstrating that pollution had already occurred. I found no publicly available water-testing data, contamination citation, forest-clearing finding, or archaeological damage assessment connected to this enforcement action.
Translation of the municipality’s substantive announcement
The municipality’s position can be translated as follows:
“The shutdown of operations at the facilities of Minera La Fortuna Lampa, located in the Cerro Carén sector, was carried out following a technical and administrative inspection procedure conducted by the Municipality of Curacaví.”
“The measure was directly prompted by the absence of the permits required to conduct operations within the municipal jurisdiction.”
“The Municipal Works Directorate verified, through technical data, that the mining company’s buildings and infrastructure were located within the territorial limits of Curacaví.”
“At the same time, inspectors from the Directorate of Environment, Sanitation and Landscaping gathered technical information regarding the operations and identified areas of environmental and heritage risk.”
“With technical reports confirming the location of the operations and the absence of local licenses or permits, the mayor exercised the legal authority established under the General Law of Urbanism and Construction.”
“The mayor ordered the closure of the facilities, requiring the immediate and complete stoppage of all plant functions.”
“The operations will remain suspended indefinitely, while a period is opened for the legal representatives of Minera La Fortuna Lampa to submit the relevant documentation and technical information to the municipal offices in order to regularize their legal status.”
That last paragraph is the most important. The municipality did not describe the closure as a one-day inspection or temporary interruption. It described the suspension as indefinite pending regularization.
What has happened since the closure?
I searched through July 12 for combinations of:
- Minera La Fortuna Lampa;
- Auryn Mining;
- Altos de Lipangue;
- Cerro Carén;
- Curacaví;
- reopening, permit regularization, appeal and lifting of closure;
- Chilean environmental and archaeological regulators.
I did not find any public notice stating that:
- the municipal seals were removed;
- the plant was authorized to restart;
- AUMC submitted and obtained the missing municipal permits;
- a court overturned or suspended the mayor’s order;
- the parties agreed that the site actually fell outside Curacaví;
- the municipality withdrew its environmental concerns.
The most recent publicly indexed reporting I found continues to describe the plant as closed and under municipal review. The local report dated June 12, 2026 said that activities remained stopped while the municipality reviewed the case and that the company could submit supporting documentation through the administrative process.
What I did not find at the national-regulator level
I found no clearly identifiable public enforcement proceeding against this specific operation in the searchable records of Chile’s national environmental enforcement system under:
- the Superintendencia del Medio Ambiente, or SMA;
- the SNIFA environmental enforcement database;
- the Environmental Assessment Service, or SEA;
- the National Monuments Council.
That does not establish that the plant is fully compliant with those agencies. It only means I could not find a publicly indexed national enforcement case under the names currently being used.
The absence of an easily located SEA or SMA record may also be relevant because the municipal allegations involve processing, crushing, tailings, water runoff and native vegetation. Whether the project was required to enter Chile’s formal environmental assessment system depends on its design, production scale, location and impacts. The available sources do not provide enough detail to reach a definitive conclusion on that question.
How serious is this for AUMC?
Immediate operational risk: high
Unless the order has been quietly modified, the municipality ordered all plant functions stopped. That directly conflicts with any representation that the flotation plant is commissioning, processing stockpiled ore or moving toward continuous operation.
AUMC would need either to:
- convince the municipality that the closure was legally or factually mistaken;
- obtain the missing local permits and business license;
- secure administrative or judicial relief allowing operations while the dispute is resolved; or
- materially change the facilities or operating plan.
Environmental liability: presently unproven, but potentially material
The municipality has raised several potentially serious subjects, but I have not found evidence that it has yet proven actual pollution or irreversible damage.
At this point, the best characterization is:
Confirmed: municipal officials identified environmental and heritage risks.
Not yet publicly demonstrated: an actual contamination event, illegal native-forest clearing, damage to archaeological remains, or a national environmental sanction.
Community and political risk: clearly elevated
The mayor framed the closure as a response to local residents:
“The voice of the residents was heard.”
That indicates the company has more than a technical permit problem. It now has an emerging social-license problem, with the municipal government publicly aligning itself with concerned residents. Even after paperwork is submitted, the municipality may face political pressure to demand stronger environmental studies, water protections, traffic controls, forest reviews and archaeological surveys.
The largest unanswered issue
The key unanswered question is not simply whether AUMC possesses mining claims or SERNAGEOMIN permissions. It is:
How did the company build and prepare to commission a processing plant without resolving which municipality had jurisdiction and obtaining that municipality’s building, business and operating approvals?
If Curacaví’s account is correct, the jurisdictional issue should ordinarily have been resolved before substantial plant construction. The fact that the municipality says it had to conduct measurements to determine that the site was in Curacaví suggests either:
- the company believed it was in Lampa;
- it relied on approvals associated with another jurisdiction;
- the municipal boundary was genuinely disputed;
- or local permits were not made a priority before construction and commissioning.
AUMC has not publicly provided enough information to determine which explanation applies.
Bottom line
My current assessment is:
The closure is real, physical and indefinite—not merely a warning letter. The confirmed legal basis is the apparent absence of Curacaví municipal permissions after officials determined that the plant lies within Curacaví. Environmental, native-forest and archaeological issues were raised as risks, but I have not found public evidence that actual contamination or damage has yet been formally proven.
Most importantly, there is no publicly available evidence through July 12, 2026 that the shutdown has been resolved or that the plant has legally restarted. Given AUMC’s recent emphasis on plant commissioning and increased throughput, the absence of a clear company disclosure about this event is material from an investor due-diligence standpoint.
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Baldy,
Still little puzzled by all of this.
If you look at the news from this perspective: “The following summarizes recent accomplishments” and noting when the last release happened, I think it does imply that they are speaking of past tense items that they hadn’t fully reported on before the shutdown occurred. Yes, they did some mining/prep work but doubt any mining is happening now. Yes, the flotation plant has reached the commissioning stage but again, I doubt it is currently operating. Can’t see how the local government can or would stop the road work so I assume that is moving forward noting a big storm/flood is expected in the Santiago in about a week that could impact any attempted road repairs.
Weird about no mention about the Caren project. Was that potential mining operation killed off?
One way or another, they need the local permits to move forward on this so there is no point in kidding ourselves that it is otherwise.
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Very hard to make sense of it. I would agree that they should have no issues advancing road/infrastructure works when the mine is shut down. The roads are likely within the Lampa jurisdiction!
Separate from the permitting/community issues, don’t you think its a bit strange that they mentioned the “new” 5000tpm (4950) thoughput out of left field? Wouldn’t they have referenced this additional capacity in the January update when they were “supposedly” a couple weeks from commissioning? I appreciate they may have officially needed to wait for the plant’s operational permit on Feb 20th to announce any modifications but that would assume they are adhering to “normal” disclosures. While they may be terrible at announcing timely material events they go out of their way to highlight any perceived positive events and I can’t imagine they forgot to mention a 65% increase in the Jan update and there’s no way they could implemented the changes over a 30 day period. More questions than answers.
Since you brought up Caren, I prompted AI to provide an overview of guidnce vs. deliverables (AI has become so useful, I’m concerned at some point I’ll forget how to use my brain)
Caren Project: Guidance vs. Delivery Summary
The history of the Caren Project illustrates a significant disconnect between management guidance and actual execution.
2016 Guidance
- Management stated mine preparation would take approximately two months before production commenced.
- Planned to ramp production to 5,000 tonnes per month within six to eight months.
- Projected 5,000 ounces of gold before the end of 2016 and more than 25,000 ounces in 2017 .
- Indicated Caren would generate positive cash flow to help fund exploration across the broader Altos de Lipangue project.
What Actually Happened
- Underground development encountered structural faults, ventilation issues and permitting delays.
- Rather than achieving commercial production, the operation completed only a limited bulk-test mining campaign.
- Public disclosures document approximately 76 tonnes of ore shipped to ENAMI.
- The first shipment averaged 11.5 g/t gold , below the 15 g/t grade used in management’s original production assumptions.
- There is no public evidence that Caren ever achieved sustained commercial production, 5,000 tonnes per month, positive operating cash flow, or anywhere near the projected gold production.
2017–2024
- Caren largely disappeared from company updates.
- No meaningful production statistics, operating results, resource updates, or evidence of sustained mining operations were publicly reported.
2025–2026
- In July 2025, management announced it had applied for a new exploitation permit for 1,000 tonnes per month , stating approval was expected “in the coming weeks.”
- By October 2025, approval was still pending but described as expected “at any time.”
- By January 2026, the language had softened further, with management stating only that geological evaluation and technical review were continuing and that updates would follow as permitting progressed.
Bottom Line
Nearly a decade after Caren was presented as an imminent producing mine capable of generating substantial cash flow, the project had effectively returned to the permitting and evaluation stage. While the company successfully completed underground development work and limited test mining, the key operational milestones originally presented—including commercial production, throughput targets, cash flow generation, and projected gold output—were not delivered based on the public record.
I recall looking at other 100 ton per day operations. The Fortuna equipment looked much larger than comparable operations right from the start. Also, it seems silly to build a flotation plant that doesn’t match your mining rate (or near term expected mining rate) especially with some stock piled ore laying around. Perhaps the reason is that they found they could simply speed up the operation faster than anticipated and still get the desired result?
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After briefly skimming the post you addressed to me, it’s clear that you’ve managed to confuse even yourself by ‘digging up past posts’ and then proceeding to misrepresent them. Oftentimes you twist up the statements someone posted, largely because you ignore the context.
Sorry, but I cannot find anything of value in this particular post, baldy - it’s just a matter of digging up the archives for regurgitation. I don’t know how you find the time to argue the past in your posts, but I don’t have the time to read them.
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Hi Mike,
You’re correct that the “mining rate” is typically at least roughly matched up with the throughput capacity of any FF plant in a mining operation. The critical thing to keep in mind is that BOTH are likely to scale up through time in parallel. In Chile, under the “small miners statute”, the “mining rate” will go up via adding operational sites each of which increase the allowable number of tonnes that can be mined per month by 1,000 TPM. The throughput capacity of the ff plants will typically go up via periodic additions, in series or in parallel, of what Auryn management likes to refer to as “additional units”.
Mike, I can’t remember if you were around back in early 2024 because I know you took some time off. Effective 1/1/24, the Chilean legislature introduced a new “Small Miners Statute” in Chile. One law was amended and another one was added. To qualify as a “small miner” you have to agree to limit production at any one operating site to a maximum of 1,000 Tonnes per month. The reward for the “small miners” willing to do this was reduced tax rates on their “patentes” (annual taxes), as well as streamlined permitting from SERNAGEOMIN as well as the environmental authorities or “SEA”. The big attraction is the STREAMLINED PERMITTING because delays (or refusals to permit) in permitting are one of the biggest RISKS (“PERMITTING RISKS”) for the smaller miners.
This new statute works out nicely for Auryn because they have 7 “Main Veins” to choose from i.e. plenty of operational sites that can be added over time. Auryn is currently allowed to mine at 1,000 TPM at the “Northeast Drift” off of the Antonino Adit. At this site, this level is expected to increase to a total of 3,000 TPM allowable during the current quarter, Q-3 of 2026. Auryn is going to attack the NE drift from several different access ramp sites which are being worked on as we speak.
As far as the “Caren Mine” goes, way back when, this was scheduled to be the first mine for Auryn to put into production. You might remember that there were 3 separate adits on the northern downslope off of the ADL plateau. They were separated by about 40-meters vertically. Auryn went into “Adit #3”, the lowest in elevation, a couple of years ago and drifted what they called the “Larrissa Adit” many hundreds of meters into the mountain. They found some pretty decent high-grade structures.
As they marched down the permitting route with SERNAGEOMIN, SERNAGEOMIN insisted that Auryn put in 3 “ventilation raises” all of the way to surface. OUCH! As you know, these can be very expensive. Auryn called an audible and sent some crews up to the Fortuna Vein to “de-mud” the prior artisanal workings and do a bunch of sampling and rehabbing of the old adits at the Fortuna Vein. They made the call to put the Fortuna Mine on the front burner and the Caren Mine went onto the back burner for now.
When Auryn did that exhaustive trenching program several years ago, the star performer was the Merlin 1 Vein. The trenching results came in at an average of 26.9 gpt gold (volume weighted) AT SURFACE, over an average width of 1.35-meters. The assumption all along was that this “Merlin 1 Vein”, that is super rich at surface, is the same vein that the artisanal miners had been mining at those 3 adits on the northern downslope off of the plateau. It turned out that at this new “Larrissa Adit” (the old Adit #3) they had intersected a different vein than the Merlin 1. They named it the “Larrissa Vein”. It is promising but it is no Fortuna Vein.
The new plan for what is referred to as the “Caren Mine”, which should really be thought of as the Merlin 1 Vein, is to mine it from the SURFACE DOWNWARDS instead of from the bottom up via the Larrissa Adit. This way you get to start out in 26 gpt gold and bring the fresh air down with you as you descend i.e. no expensive ventilation raises.
The findings at the old “Fortuna Vein” uncovered after the “de-mudding”, were even superior to the Larrissa Vein findings plus they didn’t have to put in 3 ventilation raises. At the Fortuna Mine, the artisanal miners had already put in 6 vertical “ventilation raises” and 5 vertical “ventilation chimneys”. Besides, the artisanal miners of the Fortuna Vein averaged 64 gpt gold during the 30 years they had mined the “Fortuna Vein” from 1940 to 1970. It was a “known” commodity. It was the grades they found there and not necessarily the tonnes mined (only 2,000) as this was a “mom and pop” operation.
The artisanal miners mined a 350-meter length of the 1,000-meter surface strike of the Fortuna Vein down to a depth of 100-meters of the known 700-meter depth. THEY KNOW WHAT THEY’VE GOT THERE. When they accessed the Fortuna Vein, they came in through the Northeast, heading SSW, and they basically bisected the 1,000-meter strike length of the vein at the new “Level 3”, which is that of the “Antonino Adit”. They intersected 24 new mineralized “veins/faults/structures” along the 400-meter course of the Antonino Adit. After these 24 new intersections, Auryn kept going after the Fortuna Vein because they knew how rich the Fortuna Vein was and when they intersected it they got a good glimpse of just how rich it was.
When they finally intersected the Fortuna Vein, after 3 times hitting other nice-looking veins and telling shareholders that they THOUGHT they had finally found the targeted Fortuna Vein (oops!), only to learn that all 3 of these were NOT the Fortuna Vein, they did 2 sets of channel samples each consisting of 4 groupings. The grades from Grouping #1 came in at a stellar 164 gpt gold average, and Grouping #2 served to corroborate the Group 1 findings by coming in at an average grade of 150 gpt gold. THE GRADES ARE CLEARLY GETTING BETTER WITH DEPTH AND THE VEINS ARE ALSO GETTING WIDER WITH DEPTH. The Fortuna Vein runs from NNW to SSE, they named the right-hand branch of the vein (oriented to the NNW) the “NE drift”. That’s where current operations are centered.
After Auryn finally intersected the Fortuna Vein, they took a 2,200 pound sample from near the intersection point of the Antonino Adit and the Fortuna Vein (level 3 under ventilation raise “C”) and sent it to the Enami smelter for analysis. It came back at a stellar 57 gpt gold, 987 gpt silver, and 3.23% silver which represents a 70 gpt “gold equivalent” grade. This corroborated the historical grades achieved by the artisanal miners.
They sent a second sample to the smelter testing facility at the very well respected “Plenge Lab” in Lima, Peru in order to get a “second opinion” since the Enami sample came back so high. This smelter test sample came back at an insane grade of 128 gpt gold JUST FOR THE GOLD READING. Recall that Enami said their reading for the gold content came back at 57 gpt gold (an awesome grade in and of itself) FOR THE SAME ORE. The Plenge Lab results were 2.2-times that of Enami. Maurizio told Enami, who they had intended to do business with all along, to go jump in the lake, we’re going to build our own froth flotation ore processing facility, and they did. The vote from the Auryn BOD was unanimous. That took out the “middle-man” known as Enami that would have charged steep “tolling fees”. Most small miners in Chile have to put up with Enami because they can’t afford their own FF plant.
Mike, with Auryn’s new FF plant rated at 4,950 Tonnes per month (about 60,000 Tonnes per annum), 5 separate operating sites will keep that plant busy AFTER THE STOCKPILED ORE IS EXHAUSTED i.e. 5 sites each doing 1,000 TPM. The first 3 sites will be associated with the “NE drift” and the next 2 from the Merlin 1 Vein near surface. The plan at the Merlin 1 is to put 2 access ramps into the Merlin 1 Vein. The southernmost one will have a descending spiral access and the northernmost a straight decline ramp. All 5 of these operating sites are expected to be functional this current quarter Q-3 of 2026.
But don’t forget that Auryn also has “over 60,000 Tonnes” of previously stockpiled ore. Before the “small miners statute” became effective on 1/1/24, Auryn was allowed to mine 5,000 Tonnes per month, so they’re fortunate to have done a lot of mining back then. Auryn can now choose the highest grade ore from the 60,000 Tonnes of stockpiled ore or from recently mined ore. This will keep upward pressure on the average “head grade”. A certain perecentage of the stockpiled ore has already been “sorted by grade”.
AURYN’S FROTH FLOTATION PLANT
Auryn announced that the ORIGINAL PLAN was to go with a 100 TPD flotation plant design. Later, Auryn made a revision to the plan. This is from Auryn’s 1/7/25 update: “The engineering and construction project for the plant is in full swing. While the basic components of the flotation plant are being manufactured, WE ARE COMMISSIONING THE FABRICATION OF OTHER “INDIVIDUAL UNITS” (emphasis added) and completing the project’s technical dossier for submission to SERNAGEOMIN in January 2025.” The question becomes, what did they learn subsequent to placing the original order, that made them augment the order.
Thus the “technical dossier” submitted to SERNAGEOMIN included the original 100 TPD plant plan PLUS the “individual unit” add-ons. In the mining industry these additional “individual units” regarding an FF plant, are sometimes referred to as “bolt-ons”, “add-ons”, “retrofits”, or “modular add-ons”. Until recently, management never mentioned how much these “individual units” would add to the initial 100 TPD nominal throughput figure. That figure might not have been calculable until the metallurgists and geoscientists recently “test drove” the combined original design FF plant plus the add-ons. It’s not clear yet if the add-ons were aligned in “series” or in “parallel”. The recent update cited that the FF plant being commissioned as we speak, will have a total throughput of 4,950 Tonnes per month or 165 Tonnes per day i.e. a 65% increase from the original plan. Froth flotation plants typically are run at higher throughput rates than those “nominal” throughput rates set by the manufacturer.
GROK ANALYSIS
For the inquisitive, the question then becomes what are these various “individual units” that can be added to a froth flotation plant. Question Addressed to “GROK” (AI): What are the “individual units” that can be added to an existing froth flotation plant in order to increase throughput capacity?
ANSWER FROM GROK: "Individual flotation cells (or banks of cells), flash flotation units, and modular/add-on flotation equipment are the primary “individual units” that can be added to an existing froth flotation plant.
These allow operators to expand capacity, improve recovery, optimize circuits (e.g., adding rougher, cleaner, scavenger, or flash stages), or retrofit for better performance without a full plant rebuild.
Common Individual Units Standard Flotation Cells (e.g., mechanical TankCell® or similar): Individual or banks of agitated cells with impellers for aeration and mixing. These are added in series or parallel to increase residence time, throughput, or stages in rougher/cleaner/scavenger circuits. Large modern cells (hundreds of m³) are common for capacity boosts.
Flash Flotation Units (e.g., Metso SkimAir®): These are specifically designed for easy integration into the grinding circuit (often on hydrocyclone underflow). They “flash off” fast-floating, liberated valuable particles early, reducing overgrinding, improving overall recovery, mill throughput, and dewatering. They have a small footprint and are a popular retrofit.
Column Flotation Cells (e.g., ColumnCell™ or similar): Tall, non-agitated columns using countercurrent flow. Often added for cleaning stages or fine particle recovery, as they can achieve performance equivalent to multiple conventional stages.
Specialized or Compact Units: Jameson Cells, StackCell®, Concorde Cell™, or other pneumatic/high-intensity cells for fines or specific duties.
Dissolved Air Flotation (DAF) or similar for water treatment/recovery circuits (more common in industrial/mining wastewater).
Modular/Plant Units: Pre-engineered packages (e.g., Metso Flotation Plant Units) that bundle cells, conditioners, froth handling, piping, instrumentation, and automation. These can be installed as self-contained add-ons or expansions.
Why Add These Units? Capacity expansion — Handle higher throughput or ore variability.
Performance improvement — Boost recovery/grade, reduce losses in tailings, or handle finer/coarser particles.
Circuit optimization — Add flash flotation, extra cleaning stages, or scavengers.
Retrofit advantages — Modular designs minimize downtime, footprint, and civil works; many integrate into existing piping/pumps.
Suppliers like Metso, Eriez, and others offer these as retrofits with services for sizing, installation, and automation (e.g., froth cameras, level sensors, optimizers).
metso.comF
In practice, “individual units” usually refers to standalone cells or flash units that can be plugged into the flowsheet, as opposed to a complete new plant. The best choice depends on ore type, current circuit bottlenecks, and goals—typically evaluated via plant audits, modeling, or piloting. Consult equipment vendors for site-specific recommendations." END OF GROK REPORT
This was just posted by Baldy: my comments are made within [brackets] and in CAPITAL LETTERS
"Plant Throughput
Management consistently described the flotation plant as a 100 tpd facility throughout 2024 and 2025. [correct]
In July 2026, however, the company suddenly described the approved plant as capable of processing 4,950 tonnes per month (roughly 165 tpd ) without clearly explaining:
when the capacity increased, [IT WAS OBVIOUSLY INCREASED WHEN MANAGEMENT COMMISSIONED THE FABRICATION OF THE ADDITIONAL “INDIVIDUAL UNITS”]
whether the plant was redesigned, [YES, IT WAS RE-DESIGNED TO ACCOMMODATE THE NEW “INDIVIDUAL UNITS”. SERNAGEOMIN WAS COPIED ON THIS REDESIGN VIA THE “TECHNICAL DOSSIER” THAT WAS SUBMITTED AND LATER APPROVED BY SERNAGEOMIN.]
whether larger equipment was ordered, [“ADDITIONAL” EQUIPMENT WAS ORDERED, WE DON’T KNOW IF THE ORIGINAL SIZE OF THE “ROUGHER CELL”, OR THE “CLEANER CELL”, OR THE “SCAVENGER CELL” WAS ENHANCED. WHAT WE DO KNOW IS THAT THE NEW FF PLANT HAS A THROUGHPUT OF 4,950 TONNES PER MONTH OR ABOUT 60,000 TONNES PER YEAR (ACTUALLY 59,400 TONNES PER ANNUM).]
or whether the permitting process was amended to reflect the larger plant. [SERNAGEOMIN WAS COPIED ON THE NEW “INDIVIDUAL UNITS” DURING THE SUBMISSION OF THE “TECHNICAL DOSSIER”, AND THEY SIGNED OFF ON THE NEW 4,950 TPM PLANT]
While the final permit may authorize the larger capacity, the change was never clearly disclosed as it occurred." [YES, AN INCREASE FROM THE ORIGINAL 100 TPD THROUGHPUT LEVEL WAS DISCLOSED WHEN AURYN TOLD US ABOUT THE ADDED ON “INDIVIDUAL UNITS” IN THEIR 1/7/25 QUARTERLY UPDATE. WE GOT THE EXACT FIGURE ON THIS MOST RECENT QUARTERLY UPDATE.]" END OF BALDY POST
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BB. I’m careful not to read too deeply into specific wording in any of these PRs as it often leads down the wrong rabbit holes. But, if we assume that the nameplate throughput has actually increased to 5,000tpm (vs. just another example of sloppy wording/disclosure) you and I are simply disagreeing on what constitutes “clear disclosure.” This is just a difference of opinion. While you are comfortable connecting the dots by equating their previous update that they were “adding individual units” to the equivalent of subtle guidance of increasing capacity (which is now stated at 4950tpm vs. 3000tpm) that’s certainly your perrogative. I’ve found that attempts to assume and/or connect dots to speculate on certain outcomes leads to tears (or denial) more often than not.
While I appreciate that doubling or even tripling the throughput of a plant of this size isn’t too difficult, the timing of this action suprises me. We don’t know all of the details but given the current permmitting/community challenges they are facing one would think that AUMC would do everything in their power to simply advance their intitial/orginal gameplan and THEN add, augment, and optimize. MC really needs to start hitting some of these milestones/guidance.
This being said, as MGold posted, its possible that there was no mention of the mine closure b/c this latest update was specifialy focused on progress over the previous several months vs. current or forward looking guidance. I’ve been vocal enough on my opinion on how the disclosure of the current, material event should have been handled so there’s no need to repeat myself
One suggestion for MC, assuming they are comforable that AUMC’s operations don’t actually bleed into the Curacavi’s jurisdition would be something along the following:
While we appreciate Curacavi’s concerns and rights we do not agree with ongoing claims that AUMC has violated any permitting requirement during the exploration, exploittion, development nor construction phase.
Insert picture of a map with the AUMC propoerty lines, superimposed with the Lampa/Curacavi’s borders clearly showing that operations fall entirely within the Lampa jurisdiction.
AUMC has prioritized environmental stewardship at each step of our development and is looking forward to working with the community to ensure both the company and local municipalities not only bless but benefit from the positive economic impact of this world class mining operation. With an abundance of caution, we have agreed to temporarily halt operations as we work with local leaders to reach a consensus on the optimal path forward. Our primary goal is the pursuit of a muntually benefical partnership with both the mine and local communities thriving, in parallel, over many generations.
DO disclose the material event, throw in some colorful promotion (world class deposit!!) and issue a statement that lets the locals feel like their voice as been heard. DONT wait for 40 days to make any sort of disclosure, mischaracterize what actually happened, and seemingly ignore events on the ground. This only pisses off investors who, if they are being honest, have no idea what is going on…while pissing off locals who feel like their voice isn’t being heard. This isn’t overly complicated stuff but, when you mishandle it, there can be a lasting impact.
Applying a bit of common sense, its HIGHLY unlikely that Curacavi is just fishing and AUMC’s property has no overlap Either way, they can make the environmental argument which has an extemely wide net. This means that MC needs to find a resolution and reach an agreement one way or another. How long it takes, and the ultimate outcome are riding on how he handles this challenge in public and behind closed doors.
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And go figure that all we heard about the last 5 years is how proactive they have been on the environmental front, touting their compliance.